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1 Introduction
The Arrow-Debreu model provides an elegant and parsimonious theoretical founda-
tion for the study of financial markets. It has proved to be not only the bedrock
of textbook financial economic theory, but also the benchmark relative to which
the role of “frictions”, such as taxes, asymmetric information or limits of arbitrage,
can be studied. In this paper we focus on one such friction, namely asset market
segmentation.
The same or similar assets are often traded in many different locations and at
many different prices. For instance, Mifid II in Europe and RegNMS in the US have
given rise to significant market fragmentation in equities. As a result, any one stock is
traded on many competing exchanges, multilateral trading facilities, electronic com-
munication networks, dark pools, systematic internalizers, and so on.1 Arbitrageurs,
often high frequency traders, exploit the surplus gains from trade arising from this
segmentation. These activities lead to some price alignment, the extent of which
depends on the degree of competition among arbitrageurs. In the present paper, we
study the properties of equilibria of an economy with segmented markets linked by
arbitrageurs, as the number of arbitrageurs grows without bound. The main ques-
tion we seek to answer is the following: Can an equilibrium of a segmented markets
economy, with a high degree of competition in the arbitraging sector, be approxi-
mated by a variant of Walrasian equilibrium, and if so which notion of Walrasian
equilibrium would serve this purpose?
Our point of departure is the model of strategic arbitrage in Rahi and Zigrand
(2009). This is a two-period model of financial markets with multiple market seg-
ments or “exchanges”. Markets may be incomplete on any given exchange and the
set of tradable payoffs may differ across exchanges. Each exchange is populated by
competitive investors who can trade only on that exchange, and have preferences
that yield a local CAPM. In addition, there are arbitrageurs who can trade across
exchanges and engage in Cournot competition. There is a unique Cournot-Walras
equilibrium (CWE) of this economy. Our goal is to provide a Walrasian benchmark
for the CWE, that relates the CWE to the equilibrium of an appropriately defined
competitive economy with no arbitrageurs. This characterization serves to elucidate
the role that arbitrageurs play in integrating markets.
A natural candidate for such a benchmark is the well-studied concept of Wal-
rasian equilibrium with restricted participation, wherein all agents face the same as-
set price vector but can only trade payoffs that lie in their local asset span. However,
1While market fragmentation has accelerated in recent years, it has of course always been an
important feature of the economic landscape. Allais (1967) argued for a more realistic “economy
of markets” in lieu of a “market economy”. In his Nobel speech he says: “. . . I was led to discard
the Walrasian general model of the market economy, characterized at any time, whether there
be equilibrium or not, by a single price system, the same for all the operators, - a completely
unrealistic hypothesis, - and to establish the theory of economic evolution and general equilibrium,
of maximum efficiency, and of the foundations of economic calculus, on entirely new bases resting
on . . . a new model, the model of the economy of markets (in the plural)”.
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except for a narrow class of economies, this equilibrium notion fails to approximate
a CWE. This is because a CWE is asymptotically arbitrage-free: as the number
of arbitrageurs goes to infinity, they collectively exhaust all the available arbitrage
opportunities. At a restricted-participation equilibrium, on the other hand, there
may be arbitrage opportunities that agents are unable to exploit because of their
participation constraints.
Instead, we propose a subtly different notion of equilibrium, which we call Wal-
rasian equilibrium with restricted consumption, wherein all agents face the same
asset price vector but can only consume payoffs that lie in their local asset span.
Thus agents can trade all the assets in the economy, but may have to discard con-
sumption in some states in order to stay within the imposed span. There is a unique
restricted-consumption equilibrium in our setting. It is arbitrage-free, with asset val-
uations that coincide with the subjective valuations of arbitrageurs at the CWE of
the corresponding arbitraged economy. Furthermore, as the number of arbitrageurs
grows without bound, the CWE converges to the restricted-consumption equilib-
rium. Finally, if a restricted-participation equilibrium exists, it coincides with the
restricted-consumption equilibrium if and only if the former is arbitrage-free.
What does this tell us about the role that arbitrageurs play at a CWE? A
restricted-participation equilibrium does capture the fact that arbitrageurs allow
investors to trade their local assets with the rest of the world insofar as these over-
lap with assets traded elsewhere. But the connection that we establish with the
restricted-consumption economy shows that arbitrageurs in fact allow investors to
trade all the assets in the economy. Investors gain as a result, even if future con-
sumption must be curtailed to respect their local asset market constraints.
Market segmentation has been the subject of a recent and growing literature.
In classical general equilibrium, segmentation is captured by restricted-participation
constraints on agents (see Polemarchakis and Siconolfi (1997) and Cass et al. (2001)).
Strategic arbitrage in a general equilibrium setting is the subject of Zigrand (2004,
2006). Rahi and Zigrand (2009) specialize this framework to a CAPM setting to
study security design by arbitrageurs. For an alternative approach to arbitrage in a
segmented economy, see Gromb and Vayanos (2002, 2009), who study the dynamics
of arbitrage between identical assets traded in two separate markets. An extended
discussion of the segmented markets literature in finance, including empirical work,
can be found in Rahi and Zigrand (2009). A broader “limits of arbitrage” liter-
ature considers settings in which arbitrageurs fail to eliminate mispricings due to
constraints that they face. This research is surveyed in Gromb and Vayanos (2010).
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the framework and notation in
Section 2. In Section 3, we present the equilibrium of the arbitraged economy, the
CWE. In Section 4, we propose Walrasian equilibrium with restricted consumption
as the appropriate benchmark for this CWE. We analyze Walrasian equilibrium with
restricted participation in Section 5, leading to explicit characterizations of valuation
in the restricted-consumption economy in Section 7. In Section 8, we bring together
the various preceding results to provide an overall picture of the sense in which the
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arbitraged economy is asymptotically Walrasian. Section 9 concludes.
2 The Setup
We consider an economy with two dates, 0 and 1, and a single physical consumption
good. Assets are traded at date 0, in several locations or “exchanges”, and pay off
at date 1. Uncertainty is parametrized by the state space S := {1, . . . , S}.
Associated with each exchange is a group of competitive investors who can trade
only on that exchange. Investor i ∈ Ik := {1, . . . , Ik} on exchange k ∈ K :=
{1, . . . , K} has endowments (ωk,i0 , ωk,i) ∈ R × RS, and preferences which allow a
quasilinear quadratic representation,
Uk,i(xk,i0 , x
k,i) = xk,i0 +
∑
s∈S
pis
[
xk,is −
1
2
βk,i(xk,is )
2
]
,
where xk,i0 ∈ R is consumption at date 0, xk,i ∈ RS is consumption at date 1, and pis
is the probability (common across agents) of state s. The coefficient βk,i is positive.
In addition, there is a set of arbitrageurs N := {1, . . . , N} who can trade both
within and across exchanges. Arbitrageurs are imperfectly competitive. They have
no endowments, and they care only about date 0 consumption.
Asset payoffs on exchange k are given by a full column rank payoff matrix Rk of
dimension S × Jk. The asset span on exchange k is the column space of Rk, which
we denote by 〈Rk〉. Asset spans may differ across exchanges, and we do not assume
that markets are complete on any exchange. Assets are in zero net supply.
We refer to this economy as the arbitraged economy, in order to distinguish it
from variants of a competitive economy with no arbitrageurs that we will consider
later in the paper.
The interaction between price-taking investors and strategic arbitrageurs involves
a Nash equilibrium concept with a Walrasian fringe, pioneered by Gabszewicz and
Vial (1972) (for a survey, see Mas-Colell (1982)). Let yk,n be the supply of assets on
exchange k by arbitrageur n, and yk :=
∑
n∈N y
k,n the aggregate arbitrageur supply
on exchange k. For given yk, qk(yk) is the market-clearing asset price vector on
exchange k, with the asset demand of investor i on exchange k denoted by θk,i(qk).
Definition 2.1 A Cournot-Walras equilibrium (CWE) of the arbitraged economy is
an array of asset price functions, asset demand functions, and arbitrageur supplies,
{qk : RJk → RJk , θk,i : RJk → RJk , yk,n ∈ RJk}k∈K, i∈Ik, n∈N , such that
1. Investor optimization: For given qk, θk,i(qk) solves
max
θk,i∈RJk
xk,i0 +
∑
s∈S
pis
[
xk,is −
βk,i
2
(xk,is )
2
]
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subject to the budget constraints:
xk,i0 = ω
k,i
0 − qk · θk,i,
xk,i = ωk,i +Rkθk,i.
2. Arbitrageur optimization: For given {qk(yk), {yk,n′}n′ 6=n}k∈K, yk,n solves
max
yk,n∈RJk
∑
k∈K
yk,n
>
qk
(
yk,n +
∑
n′ 6=n
yk,n
′
)
s.t.
∑
k∈K
Rkyk,n ≤ 0.
3. Market clearing:
{
qk(yk)
}
k∈K solves∑
i∈Ik
θk,i(qk(yk)) = yk, ∀k ∈ K.
Note that investors take asset prices as given, while arbitrageurs compete Cournot-
style. Arbitrageurs maximize date 0 consumption, i.e. profits from their arbitrage
trades, subject to a no-default constraint at date 1.
It is convenient to cast our analysis of equilibrium prices in terms of state-price
deflators. To this end, we introduce some more notation. Let Π := diag (pi1, . . . , piS).
For x ∈ RS, the L2(Π)-norm of x is ‖x‖2 := (x>Πx) 12 . Let
P k := Rk(Rk
>
ΠRk)−1Rk
>
Π.
Since P k is idempotent, it is a projection. Indeed, it is an orthogonal projection in
L2(Π) onto the asset span 〈Rk〉.
A vector p ∈ RS is a state-price deflator2 for (qk, Rk) if qk = Rk>Πp. If markets
are incomplete on exchange k, there is a multiplicity of state-price deflators p, all
of which satisfy qk = Rk
>
Πp. Hence, it is often useful to identify the valuation
functional for exchange k by the projected state-price deflator P kp. Clearly, if p is a
state-price deflator for (qk, Rk), so is P kp, since Rk
>
ΠP kp = Rk
>
Πp. Indeed, P kp is
the unique state-price deflator that is also marketed, i.e. in the span 〈Rk〉.
We shall also use the term state-price deflator to describe subjective, as opposed
to equilibrium, valuations. Thus a state-price deflator pA for an arbitrageur implies
the subjective asset valuation Rk
>
ΠpA on exchange k, which is in general not equal
to the equilibrium asset price vector qk.
We say that state-price deflators p and p′ are equivalent, denoted by p ≡ p′, if
P kp = P kp′, for all k ∈ K. Equivalent state-price deflators imply the same asset
valuation on any given exchange.
2We do not restrict state prices to be nonnegative, since we will have occasion to consider
economies with no arbitrageurs later in the paper. In such economies there may be unexploited
arbitrage opportunities, and hence negative state prices, in equilibrium. See Example 5.1.
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3 Cournot-Walras Equilibrium
Let βk := [
∑
i∈IK (β
k,i)−1]−1, ωk :=
∑
i∈Ik ω
k,i, and 1 := (1, . . . , 1)>, an S × 1 vector
of ones. It is shown in Rahi and Zigrand (2009) that pk,i := 1−βk,iωk,i is a no-trade
state-price deflator for agent (k, i), i.e. θk,i = 0 at qk = Rk
>
Πpk,i, and pk := 1−βkωk
is an autarky state-price deflator for exchange k, i.e.
∑
i∈Ik θ
k,i = 0 at qk = Rk
>
Πpk.
Indeed, for given arbitrageur supply yk,
qk(yk) = Rk
>
Π[pk − βkRkyk].
Thus pk − βkRkyk is a state-price deflator for exchange k. The autarky state-price
deflator pk is obtained by setting yk = 0. The parameter βk measures the “depth” of
exchange k: it is the price impact of a unit of arbitrageur trading. Notice that we can
interpret equilibrium prices as risk-neutral prices Rk
>
Π1 from which a risk-aversion
discount βkRk
>
Π(ωk +Rkyk) is subtracted.
We begin with a preliminary result. We say that a vector x ∈ RS satisfies
condition C if
(C1) x ≥ 0;
(C2)
∑
k∈K
1
βk
P k(pk − x) ≤ 0; and
(C3) x ·
[∑
k∈K
1
βk
P k(pk − x)
]
= 0.3
Lemma 3.1 Suppose x, y ∈ RS both satisfy condition C. Then x ≡ y.
Proof In order to save on notation, we use the following shorthand:
A :=
∑
k∈K
1
βk
ΠP k, (1)
b :=
∑
k∈K
1
βk
ΠP kpk. (2)
The vectors x and y satisfy condition C if and only if
x ≥ 0, Ax− b ≥ 0, x>(Ax− b) = 0, (3)
y ≥ 0, Ay − b ≥ 0, y>(Ay − b) = 0. (4)
Since ΠP k is positive semidefinite for all k, A is positive semidefinite as well. Hence,
(x− y)>A(x− y) ≥ 0, (5)
3Notice that each of the S terms that are summed up in the inner product must be less than or
equal to zero, due to C1 and C2. Hence all of these terms must in fact be zero.
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or, equivalently,
y>Ax ≤ 1
2
(x>Ax+ y>Ay). (6)
Furthermore, since y ≥ 0, from (3) and (4) we have y>Ax ≥ y>b = y>Ay, and
similarly y>Ax ≥ x>b = x>Ax. Therefore, (6) must hold with equality, and hence so
must (5), i.e.
∑
k
1
βk
(x−y)>ΠP k(x−y) = 0. Again using the fact that ΠP k is positive
semidefinite for all k, this implies that (x− y)>ΠP k(x− y)= 0, or ‖P k(x−y)‖22 = 0,
for all k. Hence, P k(x− y) = 0, for all k. 
In particular, the lemma tells us that all state-price deflators that satisfy condition
C induce the same asset valuation on any given exchange.
We now present our CWE characterization. It turns out that there is a unique4
CWE which is symmetric, with all arbitrageurs acting alike and sharing the same
subjective asset valuations. These valuations can be described in terms of a (sub-
jective) state-price deflator pA, common across all arbitrageurs, where pAs is each
arbitrageur’s marginal shadow value of consumption in state s.5
Proposition 3.1 (CWE) There is a unique CWE.
1. There exists pA satisfying condition C such that equilibrium arbitrageur supplies
of state-contingent consumption are given by
Rkyk,n =
1
(1 +N)βk
· P k (pk − pA) , k ∈ K.
2. Equilibrium asset prices on exchange k are given by qk = Rk
>
Πpˆk, where
pˆk :=
1
1 +N
pk +
N
1 +N
pA. (7)
Thus pˆk is an equilibrium state-price deflator for exchange k.
3. The equilibrium profit of each arbitrageur is given by∑
k∈K
qk · yk,n = 1
(1 +N)2
·
∑
k∈K
1
βk
‖P k(pk − pA)‖22.
4. The equilibrium demands of investors for state-contingent consumption are
given by
Rkθk,i =
1
βk,i
P k(pk,i − pˆk), k ∈ K, i ∈ Ik. (8)
4By uniqueness we mean that the equilibrium allocation and pricing functional on each exchange
are unique. There may, of course, be multiple state-price deflators that induce the same equilibrium
pricing functional.
5Formally, pAs is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the arbitrageur’s no-default constraint
in state s.
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Proof Items 1–4 are established in Rahi and Zigrand (2009). From Lemma 3.1,
any choice of pA that satisfies condition C gives us the same asset valuation, i.e.
P kpA is unique. It follows that asset supplies are unique as well, and so is the CWE.

Arbitrageurs supply consumption in state s to exchange k if the price that agents
on exchange k are willing to pay for a unit of state s consumption, pks , exceeds the
arbitrageurs’ shadow willingness to pay, pAs , once the excess willingness to pay is
projected onto the span of the permissible assets. This supply is higher the deeper
is exchange k (i.e. the lower is βk).
Note that the arbitrageur valuation pA is nonnegative (since it satisfies C) and
does not depend on the number of arbitrageurs N . As N grows without bound, the
equilibrium valuation on every exchange converges to pA, i.e. limN→∞ qk = Rk
>
ΠpA,
for all k. At the same time, individual arbitrageur trades vanish, as do total arbi-
trageur profits.
Our goal in the rest of the paper is to provide a Walrasian benchmark for a CWE.
We will show that the arbitraged economy is asymptotically Walrasian, in the sense
that the CWE of this economy converges to the equilibrium of an appropriately
defined competitive economy with no arbitrageurs. This characterization turns out
to be very useful in clarifying the role of arbitrageurs in integrating markets.
4 Equilibrium with Restricted Consumption
In this section we analyze a competitive economy with no arbitrageurs which has the
following convenient property: a Walrasian equilibrium state-price deflator of this
economy is equivalent to pA, the arbitrageurs’ subjective state-price deflator in the
arbitraged economy.
Definition 4.1 A Walrasian equilibrium with restricted consumption (WERC) is a
state-price deflator pRC, and portfolios {θk,i, ϕk,i,`}k∈K, i∈Ik, `∈K, such that
1. Investor optimization: For given qk = Rk
>
ΠpRC, k ∈ K, {θk,i, {ϕk,i,`}`∈K}
solves
max
θk,i∈RJk , ϕk,i,`∈RJ`
xk,i0 +
∑
s∈S
pis
[
xk,is −
βk,i
2
(xk,is )
2
]
s.t. xk,i0 = ω
k,i
0 − qk · θk,i −
∑
`∈K
q` · ϕk,i,`,
xk,i = ωk,i +Rkθk,i,∑
`∈K
R`ϕk,i,` ≥ 0.
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2. Market clearing: ∑
k∈K, i∈Ik
Rkθk,i +
∑
k∈K, i∈Ik, `∈K
R`ϕk,i,` = 0.
At a WERC, agents can trade any asset in the economy, facing a common state-
price deflator pRC , but agents on exchange k can consume payoffs in 〈Rk〉 only. For
agent (k, i), the portfolio that leads to future consumption is θk,i. He can choose,
in addition, an auxiliary portfolio {ϕk,i,`}`∈K , provided the payoff of this portfolio
is nonnegative. As we shall explain later (in particular, see Example 5.1 and the
ensuing discussion), the auxiliary portfolio mimics the role played by arbitrageurs
at a CWE, by allowing investors access to global markets but not to additional
consumption outside their local asset span.
Given asset payoffs {Rk}k∈K , we say that asset prices {qk}k∈K are globally weakly
arbitrage-free if an agent with access to all the asset markets in the economy is unable
to construct a weak arbitrage, i.e. for any portfolio {zk}k∈K satisfying
∑
k∈K R
kzk ≥
0, we have
∑
k∈K q
k ·zk ≥ 0. By the fundamental theorem of asset pricing, this is the
case if and only if there exists ψ ≥ 0 such that qk = Rk>Πψ, for all k. Clearly, due to
the auxiliary portfolio, there cannot be a global weak arbitrage at a WERC. Hence
an equilibrium state-price deflator pRC can always be chosen to be nonnegative.
Moreover, as the following proposition shows, there is a unique WERC and the asset
valuation at this WERC coincides with the asset valuation of arbitrageurs at the
corresponding CWE.
Proposition 4.1 (WERC) There is a unique WERC with pRC ≡ pA, and
Rkθk,i =
1
βk,i
P k(pk,i − pRC), k ∈ K, i ∈ Ik. (9)
Proof The Lagrangian for agent (k, i)’s optimization problem is
L = ωk,i0 − qk · θk,i −
∑
`∈K
q` · ϕk,i,` + 1>Π(ωk,i +Rkθk,i)
− β
k,i
2
(ωk,i +Rkθk,i)>Π(ωk,i +Rkθk,i) + ψk,i
>
Π
∑
`∈K
R`ϕk,i,`,
9
where ψk,i ∈ RS is a vector of Lagrange multipliers. Writing qk = Rk>ΠpRC , the
first-order conditions are equivalent to:6
θk,i =
1
βk,i
(Rk
>
ΠRk)−1Rk
>
Π(pk,i − pRC), (10)
R`
>
Πψk,i = q` = R`
>
ΠpRC , ∀` ∈ K, (11)
ψk,i ≥ 0, (12)∑
`∈K
R`ϕk,i,` ≥ 0, (13)
ψk,i ·
(∑
`∈K
R`ϕk,i,`
)
= 0. (14)
In addition, we have the market-clearing condition:∑
k,i
Rkθk,i = −
∑
k,i,`
R`ϕk,i,`. (15)
A WERC is completely characterized by equations (10)–(15). Equation (10) gives
us the desired allocation (9), which in turn implies that∑
k,i
Rkθk,i =
∑
k
1
βk
P k(pk − pRC). (16)
Equations (11) and (12) are the usual no-arbitrage conditions. In particular, R`
>
Πψk,i
is independent of (k, i), so we can choose ψk,i to be the same for all (k, i), and pRC
equal to this common value. Thus
pRC = ψk,i ≥ 0. (17)
Equations (13)–(17) together imply that pRC satisfies condition C. Since pA also
satisfies condition C (Proposition 3.1(1)), we see from Lemma 3.1 that pRC ≡ pA,
and moreover that the implied asset valuation is unique. The equilibrium allocation
is then uniquely determined by (9). 
Proposition 4.1 shows that a WERC is the appropriate Walrasian foundation for
a CWE. Before expanding on this theme, we consider another, more familiar, notion
of restricted Walrasian equilibrium.
5 Equilibrium with Restricted Participation
Segmented asset markets have been widely studied in the general equilibrium lit-
erature in the context of a Walrasian economy with restricted participation. In
6In view of (12), equation (14) holds if and only if each of the S terms that are summed up in
the inner product is zero.
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such an economy, agents face a common state-price deflator pRP , but agents on ex-
change k can trade claims in 〈Rk〉 only. In this section, we show that valuation
in a restricted-participation economy differs in a subtle way from valuation in the
restricted-consumption economy studied above. In general, Walrasian equilibrium
with restricted participation is not a suitable benchmark for a CWE, as it captures
only a subset of trades that are mediated by arbitrageurs in the arbitraged economy.
Definition 5.1 A Walrasian equilibrium with restricted participation (WERP) is a
state-price deflator pRP , and portfolios {θk,i}k∈K, i∈Ik , such that
1. Investor optimization: For given qk = Rk
>
ΠpRP , θk,i solves
max
θk,i∈RJk
xk,i0 +
∑
s∈S
pis
[
xk,is −
βk,i
2
(xk,is )
2
]
s.t. xk,i0 = ω
k,i
0 − qk · θk,i,
xk,i = ωk,i +Rkθk,i.
2. Market clearing: ∑
k∈K, i∈Ik
Rkθk,i = 0.
Defining
λk :=
1
βk∑K
j=1
1
βj
,
we have the following characterization of a WERP, analogous to Proposition 4.1 for
a WERC:
Proposition 5.1 (WERP) pRP is a WERP state-price deflator if and only if it
solves ∑
k∈K
λkP k(pk − pRP ) = 0. (18)
The corresponding net trades of state-contingent consumption are given by
Rkθk,i =
1
βk,i
P k(pk,i − pRP ), k ∈ K, i ∈ Ik. (19)
If a WERP exists, it is unique.
Proof At a WERP, agent (k, i) solves
max
θk,i∈RJk
ωk,i0 − qk · θk,i + 1>Π(ωk,i +Rkθk,i)−
βk,i
2
(ωk,i +Rkθk,i)>Π(ωk,i +Rkθk,i).
11
Writing qk = Rk
>
ΠpRP , the first-order condition yields the optimal portfolio,
θk,i =
1
βk,i
(Rk
>
ΠRk)−1Rk
>
Π(pk,i − pRP ),
which gives us (19). The market-clearing condition is∑
k,i
Rkθk,i =
∑
k
1
βk
P k(pk − pRP ) = 0,
which is equivalent to (18).
In order to show uniqueness, we adapt the argument in the proof of Lemma 3.1.
Let x and y be two values of pRP that satisfy equation (18). Using the shorthand
notation defined in (1) and (2), we have Ax − b = 0 and Ay − b = 0. Hence
(x− y)>A(x− y) = 0, i.e. ∑k 1βk (x− y)>ΠP k(x− y) = 0. Now since ΠP k is positive
semidefinite for each k, this implies that (x− y)>ΠP k(x− y)= 0, or ‖P k(x− y)‖22 =
0, for all k. Hence, P k(x− y) = 0, for all k. Thus x and y are equivalent state-price
deflators which give us the same asset valuation on each exchange. Portfolios are
then uniquely pinned down by (19). 
While there is always a nonnegative pRC , by Proposition 4.1, this is not the case
for pRP . The following example illustrates:
Example 5.1 (WERP vs WERC) Consider an economy with two states of the
world, two exchanges, and a single agent on each exchange. We refer to the agent
on exchange k as agent k, k = 1, 2. The payoff matrices are
R1 =
[
1
0
]
,
R2 =
[
1
1
]
.
The two exchanges are equally deep, with β1 and β2 both equal to β¯, which satisfies
0 < β¯ <
pi1
1 + pi1
. (20)
Date 1 endowments are as follows: ω1 = 1 and ω2 = (1/β¯−1)1. Autarky state-price
deflators are, therefore, p1 = (1 − β¯)1 and p2 = β¯1, respectively. Agent 1 values
date 1 consumption more than agent 2. In autarky, q1 = (1 − β¯)pi1, and q2 = β¯.
The restriction (20) implies that q1 > q2. Thus there exist profit opportunities for
arbitrageurs, buying on exchange 2 and delivering to exchange 1.
Now consider a WERP of this economy: agents face a common state-price deflator
pRP , but can only trade claims that lie in their local asset span. Since 〈R1〉 ∩ 〈R2〉 =
{0}, however, the two agents cannot trade with each other. Equilibrium asset prices
are the same as in autarky. Since these prices allow for an arbitrage, albeit for a
hypothetical agent with access to all markets, at least one of the state prices must be
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negative. The state-price deflator pRP (which is unique since markets are complete
in the integrated economy) solves qk = Rk
>
ΠpRP , k = 1, 2:
pRP =
[
1− β¯
(1/pi2)[(1 + pi1)β¯ − pi1]
]
.
It follows from (20) that pRP2 < 0. Notice that this is not due to the non-monotonicity
of quadratic utility. Equilibrium consumption at date 1 (which is just the initial
endowment for both agents) is below the bliss point 1/β¯.
At the WERP, agents are unable to exploit the arbitrage opportunity, because
doing so would take them outside their local asset span. In particular, if agent 1
were to buy the riskfree asset (which is underpriced from his perspective) from agent
2, he would end up with excess consumption in state 2. At the WERC, on the other
hand, agents can arbitrage away the mispricing. Agent 1 simply disposes of the state
2 consumption good that he acquires from agent 2. Consequently pRC2 = 0 (implying
that q1 = q2). The equilibrium net trade of state-contingent consumption is given
by Rkθk = 1
βk
P k(pk − pRC), k = 1, 2. The projections P 1 and P 2 are:
P 1 =
[
1 0
0 0
]
,
P 2 =
[
pi1 pi2
pi1 pi2
]
.
Therefore, noting that pRC2 = 0,
R1θ1 =
1− β¯ − pRC1
β¯
[
1
0
]
,
R2θ2 =
β¯ − pi1pRC1
β¯
[
1
1
]
.
Market clearing for state 1 (in which there is no excess consumption) gives us pRC1 =
1
1+pi1
, so that
R1θ1 =
[
α
0
]
,
R2θ2 =
[−α
−α
]
,
where
α :=
pi1
β¯(1 + pi1)
− 1.
From (20) it follows that α > 0. Agent 2 effectively sells α units of the riskfree asset
to agent 1. Through this trade, agent 2 reduces his date 1 consumption by α in
both states (and increases his date 0 consumption). Agent 1, on the other hand, is
constrained by his local asset span to augment his date 1 consumption only in state
1. He increases his consumption in state 1 by α, while disposing of α units of state
2 consumption. It is easy to check that date 1 consumption at the WERC is below
the bliss point 1/β¯ for both agents. Indeed, this would be the case even if agent 1
were allowed to consume the “excess” consumption in state 2; in other words, this
consumption is in excess because it lies outside the permissible span, not because it
takes the agent past his bliss point. ‖
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The two notions of restricted Walrasian equilibrium differ in two key respects
(both of which are captured by the auxiliary portfolios {ϕk,i,`}). First, at a WERP
agents cannot trade claims outside their local asset span, while they can at a WERC.
Second, the market-clearing condition at a WERC is weaker: at a WERC, we have∑
k R
kθk ≤ 0, while at a WERP,∑k Rkθk = 0. There may be arbitrage opportunities
at a WERP that investors are unable to exploit due to their restricted-participation
constraints. This is not the case at a WERC.
Both notions of equilibrium capture the idea that arbitrageurs allow investors to
trade their own claims abroad. The weaker restrictions implicit in a WERC mimic
the allocational role that arbitrageurs play over and above their mediation of this
obvious category of trades. Indeed, arbitrageurs allow investors to trade any claim
available in the economy. Investors can thereby exploit good deals in the global
markets, which relaxes their date 0 budget constraint. They are better off as a
result, even if they have to discard consumption in some states at date 1 (via the
arbitrageurs) to remain within their local asset span.
Notice that the state-price deflator pRC need not be strictly positive. This is
due to the fact that investors by construction behave as if they are satiated in those
directions of the consumption space that lie outside the imposed span. The states
in which investors dispose of consumption at a WERC are precisely those in which
arbitrageurs dispose of consumption at the CWE of the corresponding arbitraged
economy, due to their inability to bring it back to date 0 without disturbing their
arbitrage portfolio. In these states, pRCs = p
A
s .
6 Equilibrium with Complete Markets
A third notion of Walrasian equilibrium, indeed the most natural one, that we
will have occasion to consider is Walrasian equilibrium with complete markets (or
WECM). Formally, a WECM is just a special case of a WERP, with Rk = P k = I,
for all k. We denote a WECM state-price deflator by pCM . Due to market complete-
ness, the state-price deflator associated with a given WECM is unique. In fact, there
is a unique WECM:
Proposition 6.1 (WECM) There is a unique WECM, with
pCM =
∑
k∈K
λkpk,
and
θk,i =
1
βk,i
(pk,i − pCM), k ∈ K, i ∈ Ik.
This result is immediate from Proposition 5.1. The state-price deflator pCM can
be interpreted as the investors’ economy-wide average willingness to pay, with the
willingness to pay on each exchange weighted by its relative depth.
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7 Explicit Characterizations
We have argued above that while a WERC serves as a suitable Walrasian benchmark
for a CWE, in general a WERP does not. This is because at a WERP there may
be unexploited arbitrage opportunities, a situation that clearly cannot arise in an
economy with an unbounded number of arbitrageurs. However, what if a WERP
happens to be arbitrage-free?
Proposition 7.1 Suppose a WERP exists. There is no global weak arbitrage at the
WERP if and only if pRP ≡ pRC.
Proof By the FTAP, there is no global weak arbitrage at the WERP if and only if
there exists a nonnegative pRP . If pRP ≥ 0, the equations characterizing the WERC,
(10)–(15), are satisfied at ψk,i = pRC = pRP , and ϕk,i,` = 0, for all k, i, `. Hence
pRP ≡ pRC . Conversely, if pRP ≡ pRC , then pRP can be chosen to be nonnegative.

Thus, if there is an arbitrage-free WERP, it does serve as a suitable Walrasian
benchmark for the corresponding CWE. While this is applicable in an admittedly
narrow class of economies, it is nevertheless of interest. As we shall see shortly,
the assumptions commonly made in the literature limit us to this set of economies.
Moreover, under these assumptions, there is a simple closed-form solution for pRP .
Arbitrage opportunities can arise at a WERP because of the participation con-
straints that investors face, as in Example 5.1, or because investors who could po-
tentially exploit these opportunities are satiated. A sufficient condition for a WERP
to be arbitrage-free is that there is an investor who has access to all asset markets in
the economy, and that this investor is nonsatiated at the equilibrium. The market
access condition in our setting is simply the following:
(S1) 〈R1〉 contains 〈Rk〉, for all k ∈ K.
It says that there is an exchange (which we take to be exchange 1 without loss of
generality) that has maximal asset span, in that this span contains the spans of
all other exchanges. Thus investors on exchange 1 can trade all the assets in the
economy.
In order to state the nonsatiation condition in terms of the primitives of the
economy, it is convenient to introduce some additional notation. Let
β :=
[∑
k
(βk)−1
]−1
Q1 :=
[
λ1I +
∑
k 6=1
λkP k
]−1
,
Qk :=
[
λ1I +
∑
k 6=1
λkP k
]−1
P k, k 6= 1.
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The inverse in the definition of Qk exists since the matrix
λ1Π−1 +
∑
k 6=1
λkRk(Rk
>
ΠRk)−1Rk
>
is positive definite, hence invertible. We will employ the following nonsatiation con-
dition:
(N1) 1− β ·∑k∈K Qkωk ≥ 0.
It says that the representative agent with aggregate preference parameter β is non-
satiated at the weighted aggregate endowment,
∑
k∈K Q
kωk.
Proposition 7.2 Under S1, pRP ≡ p¯RP , where
p¯RP :=
∑
k∈K
λkQkpk. (21)
Furthermore, p¯RP ≥ 0 if and only if N1 holds so that, under S1 and N1, pRC ≡
pRP ≡ p¯RP .
Proof From (21), [
λ1I +
∑
k 6=1
λkP k
]
p¯RP = λ1p1 +
∑
j 6=1
λjP jpj.
Premultiplying both sides by P 1, and noting that S1 implies that P 1P k = P k:[
λ1P 1 +
∑
k 6=1
λkP k
]
p¯RP = λ1P 1p1 +
∑
j 6=1
λjP jpj,
i.e. ∑
k
λkP k(pk − p¯RP ) = 0.
Therefore, pRP = p¯RP solves (18). Recalling that pk = 1− βkωk, it is easy to verify
that p¯RP = 1− β ·∑k∈K Qkωk, so that p¯RP ≥ 0 if and only if N1 holds.7 
A sharper characterization of pRP can be obtained under the following alternative
set of conditions (we define ω :=
∑
k ω
k):
(S2) Either (a) 〈Rk〉 = 〈R〉, k ∈ K, or (b) pk − pCM ∈ 〈Rk〉, k ∈ K.
(N2) 1− βω ≥ 0.
7Exactly the same proof goes through if we assume from the start that P 1 = I. Thus p¯RP is
the (unique) WERP state-price deflator of the economy in which asset payoffs are the same as in
the original economy except that markets are complete on exchange 1.
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Condition S2(a) specializes S1 to the case in which all exchanges have the same
asset span. S2(b) is the condition that characterizes equilibrium security design in a
setting in which arbitrageurs choose the asset structure {Rk}k∈K prior to the Cournot
game in which they carry out their arbitrage trades (see Rahi and Zigrand (2009)).
Notice that S1 and S2 are not nested. Condition N2 says that the representative
investor for the whole economy with aggregate preference parameter β is weakly
nonsatiated at the aggregate endowment ω.
Proposition 7.3 Under S2, pRP ≡ pCM . Furthermore, pCM ≥ 0 if and only if N2
holds so that, under S2 and N2, we have pRC ≡ pRP ≡ pCM .
Proof If S2(a) holds, P k = P , for all k. Then it is easy to see that pRP = pCM
solves (18).8 Under S2(b), P k(pk−pCM) = pk−pCM , so pCM solves (18) in this case
as well. Finally, note that pCM = 1− βω, so that pCM ≥ 0 if and only if N2 holds.

While condition S2 is quite restrictive, it is nevertheless more general than the
assumption that the same assets are traded on every exchange, an assumption that
is commonly made in the literature on arbitrage in asset markets.
8 Convergence to Walrasian Equilibrium
Recall that, in the arbitraged economy, as the number of arbitrageurs goes to infinity,
asset prices converge to the arbitrageur valuation of assets at the CWE (see equation
(7)). We have shown that the latter is just the asset valuation at the WERC of the
corresponding Walrasian economy (Proposition 4.1). Comparing (8) and (9), we
also see that the equilibrium allocation (for investors) in the arbitraged economy
converges to the WERC allocation. Closed-form solutions for the WERC valuation
can be derived under restrictions on preferences, endowments and the asset structure
that ensure that the WERC and WERP coincide (Propositions 7.2 and 7.3). We
summarize these observations in the following proposition, which makes precise the
sense in which the arbitraged economy is asymptotically Walrasian:
8If markets are complete, pCM is the unique solution to (18). If markets are incomplete, so that
the common span 〈R〉 is a strict subset of RS , pCM is still a solution, but it is not the only one.
All solutions are of course equivalent to pCM .
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Proposition 8.1 (Convergence to Walrasian equilibrium)
1. As the number of arbitrageurs N goes to infinity, the equilibrium valuation on
exchange k in the arbitraged economy converges to the WERC valuation, i.e.
limN→∞ qk = Rk
>
ΠpRC. Under S1 and N1, this is also the WERP valua-
tion, Rk
>
Πp¯RP . Under S2 and N2, it coincides with the WECM valuation,
Rk
>
ΠpCM .
2. As the number of arbitrageurs N goes to infinity, the equilibrium allocation in
the arbitraged economy converges to the WERC allocation. Under either S1
and N1, or under S2 and N2, this is also the WERP allocation.
As stated in the proposition, under S2 and N2, we get convergence to the WECM
valuation. However, we do not get convergence to the WECM allocation unless it
coincides with the WERP allocation. A sufficient condition for the latter is complete
markets on each exchange (〈Rk〉 = RS, for all k), in addition to N2. For an economy
in which investors on any given exchange have the same no-trade valuations, i.e.
pk,i = pk, for all i ∈ Ik, S2(b) and N2 suffice as well.
9 Conclusion
Given an economy with an arbitrary asset structure, if we view Walrasian equilibria
as approximations to more complex equilibria with segmented markets and strate-
gic arbitrageurs, the concept of Walrasian equilibrium with restricted consumption
introduced in this paper is the appropriate benchmark, rather than the well-studied
and intuitive notion of Walrasian equilibrium with restricted participation. The sub-
tle difference between these two kinds of Walrasian equilibrium clarifies the sense in
which arbitrageurs serve to integrate markets in the arbitraged economy.
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